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Introduction
Natural resource managers worldwide face a challenge of how
to limit the occurrence of accidentally and intentionally ignited
wildfires that destroy property, damage resources and harm
people. A changing climate is projected to increase wildfire
potential, severity and extent (e.g. Krawchuk et al. 2009; Liu
et al. 2010; Jolly et al. 2015), potentially exacerbating the
damages and raising the urgency of addressing human-ignited
wildfires (Balch et al. 2017; Bowman et al. 2017). Among the
strategies and tactics available to policy-makers in response to
heightened wildfire risks is to boost law enforcement efforts
(e.g. Donoghue and Main 1985; Butry and Prestemon 2005;
Prestemon and Butry 2005; Prestemon and Butry 2010; Abt
et al. 2015) aimed at apprehending and deterring intentional
firesetters.1With only a few exceptions (e.g. Thomas et al. 2011;
Prestemon et al. 2012), research has not evaluated how and
whether arrests, a discrete measure of law enforcement efforts,
are linked to reductions in the occurrence of intentional fires
or whether such efforts have broader impacts across space
and time.
The effects of law enforcement efforts are potentially com-
plex, considering motivated offenders’ dynamic responses.
Criminologists have long recognised that actions by law
enforcement or other groups intended to reduce crime in one
time or place or of one type might be at least partially offset by
compensating shifts in behaviours of prospective offenders in
response to those efforts (e.g. Cornish andClarke 1987; Barr and
Pease 1990; Eck 1993; Clarke and Weisburd 1994; Guerette
2009). Although spatiotemporal concentrations in arson are
evident in maps of wildfires (e.g. Mothershead 2012), no study
has sought to characterise the effects of arrests on these fires at
fine spatial scales or over longer time scales than detected by
Prestemon et al. (2012). Understanding how law enforcement
efforts affect the timing and locations of future offending,
including illegal firesetting, is critical to enacting effective
policies and in the design of more effective law enforcement
strategies (e.g. Weisburd and Eck 2004) aimed at reducing the
occurrence of unwanted wildfires.
The primary objective of our study is to assess whether there
is evidence of spatiotemporal displacement effects of law
1In this study, we define all intentional firesetting as illegal and so refer to intentional illegal firesetting as ‘intentional firesetting’.
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enforcement in intentional outdoor firesetting. To do this, we
develop statistical models that control for hypothesised driving
factors in addition to arrests. Among the driving factors we
include are variables describing the seasonality of intentional
firesetting, which likely stems from regular variations in fuel
flammability and ignition attempts related to agricultural or
other seasonal activities (e.g. hunting) and daily human routines
(days of the week and holidays). Additionally, we include
variables explaining firesetting variation at longer time scales,
which capture associations with slowly changing aggregate
wildland fuels and demographic and economic conditions.
Finally, we include a set of indicators of election seasons, which
have been shown in other research to be criminogenic for
firesetting in Europe (e.g. Seijo 2005; Álvarez-Dı́az et al.
2015; Ramos and Sanz 2018).2 With the inclusion of election
season indicators, we are able to quantify the daily time scale
imprint of one form of politically based protest actions (Pyne
1995), extending existing research and providing additional
policy-relevant insights. Their inclusion also helps to explain
variation in observed intentional wildfires, increasing the power
of our statistical inferences regarding law enforcement spatio-
temporal effects.
This study advances the earlier work by Prestemon et al.
(2012) by including spatiotemporal lags of arrests in the
equation specifications. Although those authors allowed for
effects of arrests at long temporal scales, their models did not
include arrests lagged as long as in the present study. Further-
more, their models were not specified in a way that quantified
how intentional fires in one location could be associated with
arrests in nearby locations in previous time periods. Finally,
Prestemon et al. (2012) ignored the potentially differing fire-
setting processes across reported motivations, which we find are
distinct in their responses to arrests, a potentially important
distinction with implications for law enforcement resource
allocation decisions. The study also advances research into the
role of elections on wildfires in Spain conducted by Álvarez-
Dı́az et al. (2015), who used reduced-form vector error correc-
tion modelling methods to identify the association between
the total numbers of forest fires during ‘intense’ electoral
years. Our study, in contrast, estimates count data structural
equations of intentional wildfires in Spain, controlling for the
many factors that influence wildfire ignition processes, includ-
ing the motivations of firesetters, arrests and elections. Our
equations are estimated at fine temporal (daily) and spatial
(municipality) scales, measuring how specific phases of elec-
tions affect the daily pattern of firesetting in the run-up to
elections.
Theory and methods
Theory of intentional firesetting
Cohen and Felson (1979) describe a Routine Activities (RA)
theory of crime that forms the foundation on which we build our
empirical model of the numbers of intentional wildfires. These
authors contend that criminal activities vary over time and space
according to variations in the simultaneous overlap of three
essential elements of crime occurrence: (1) a motivated
offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) the absence of capable
guardians against a violation; if one of these elements ismissing,
then a crime will not occur. It is straightforward to design an
empirical modelling framework around RA theory because
motivated offenders and suitable targets are simple to define.
Geographers, philosophers and criminologists dating back
several centuries have recognised that persistent criminal activ-
ity has evident spatial components related to societal and
landscape features (see Cohen 1941 and Cohen and Felson
1979 for informative syntheses). As Cohen and Felson (1979)
argue, defining RA theory, persistent spatial and temporal
concentrations of offending may be attributed to fine- and
coarse-scale spatial and temporal (hourly, daily, seasonal)
features of landscapes and routine human behaviours as well
as to temporally trending variations in the relative abundances of
motivated offenders, suitable targets and capable guardians.
Here, we propose that RA theory is an amenable framework for
understanding these observed spatial and temporal patterns. In
the development of an empirical version of an RA theory of
intentional firesetting, we identify candidate physical, biologi-
cal and societal variables that vary over space and time that can
be mapped to one (or more) of the three elements of RA theory.
With this empirical framework, we are able to test for spatio-
temporal displacement and uncover the effects of other policy-
relevant phenomena on intentional firesetting.
We summarise the variables connected to each of these three
elements of RA theory as it relates to intentional firesetting:
Motivated offenders
Variations in the numbers of motivated firesetters in a
location are likely related to several demographic, social and
economic factors, including the size of the human population,
historical efforts to remove known offenders from the location
and factors that influence motivations to offend. Such motiva-
tional factors can be broadly defined as incentives to commit a
crime (e.g. utility gained or pecuniary benefits acquired). In the
case of intentional wildland firesetting, greater incentives might
exist during times of political discord (Dyke 2007), when
firesetters protest by igniting wildfires (e.g. Pyne 1995; Kull
2002; Seijo 2005, 2009; Hovardas 2014, 2015; Skouras and
Christodoulakis 2014; Álvarez-Dı́az et al. 2015; Ramos and
Sanz 2018); when agricultural areas may be prepared for
planting by (illegally) burning them; and when the opportunity
costs of time for firesetters are low (e.g. in times and places
where they are unemployed) (e.g. Prestemon and Butry 2005;
Sebastián-López et al. 2008), which reduces the pecuniary cost
of spending time trying to ignite fires and the expected costs of
being arrested and imprisoned for igniting a fire.
Suitable targets
Variations in suitable targets for intentional wildfires can
be explained by variations in the availability of flammable
2Mechanisms proposed or identified for how electoral cycles could influence intentional firesetting include election-related adjustments in law enforcement
effectiveness – law enforcement budgets (Efthyvoulou 2012) and police force levels (Levitt 1997) – and the scope or severity of criminal sanctions (Smith
2004; Dyke 2007; Berdejó and Yuchtman 2013).
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wildland fuels and in the weather suitable for successful ignition
and spread.
Capable guardians
Variations over time and space of capable guardians could be
indexed by law enforcement efforts: the number of patrol
officers or the effectiveness of law enforcement actions (e.g.
arrests). Measures of political discord, which can induce reallo-
cations of law enforcement resources across space and time,
could further be proxies for short-run changes in capable
guardianship.
Our introduction of arrests into an RA-based theory of
intentional firesetting bears further exploration. Because
offenders who are caught are often sanctioned by imprison-
ment, an arrest actually affects two elements of RA theory.
First, the arrest can shrink the pool of motivated offenders by
removing spatially stationary serial criminals from the land-
scape (e.g. Canela-Cacho et al. 1997; Ratcliffe and Rengert
2008). Second, an arrest, if observed widely across space,
potentially raises the perceived strength of capable guardian-
ship.3 Guardianship adjustments may be more likely to occur
close to the location of the arrest (e.g. Levitt 1998; Pogarsky
et al. 2004), we hypothesise, because arrest informationmay be
more readily communicated locally to motivated offenders,
achieving a local crime reduction subsequent to the arrest. If
the arrest information is more broadly disseminated across
space, then this adjustment could result in a deterrent effect
across a larger spatial domain, revealed, in the case of inten-
tional firesetting, as a reduction in the number of fires in
subsequent time periods in surrounding locations. The moti-
vated offender may also be induced by an arrest to change their
‘domestic base’ of operation in order to avoid localities where
capable guardianship has increased (e.g. Telep et al. 2014).
The result of this dynamic response by motivated offenders
may be higher overall crime rates farther from the arrest
location in subsequent time periods, revealing how law
enforcement actions could displace crime in space–time (e.g.
Eck 1993; Bowers and Johnson 2003; Guerette and Bowers
2009; Bowers et al. 2011). Displacement caused by an arrest
would be revealed by, all other things being equal, higher
numbers of intentional fires in subsequent time periods in areas
more distant from the arrest location.
Application of RA theory to intentional firesetting should
comprehend existing evidence of positive temporal autocorre-
lation in intentional firesetting (e.g. Butry and Prestemon 2005;
Prestemon et al. 2012). The cited studies attribute positive
autocorrelation to a combination of serial and copycat fire-
setting. Kocsis and Irwin (1997) find that serial arsonists (along
with rapists and burglars) tend to commit their crimes close to
their domestic base but also exhibit an occasional ‘commuter
pattern’, ranging farther from the domestic base to carry out
some of their offending. Such spatiotemporal clustering of
firesetting is consistent with the near repeat hypothesis in crime
victimisation tested by many analysts of certain property crimes
(e.g. Townsley et al. 2003; Bowers and Johnson 2005; Bernasco
2008; Ratcliffe and Rengert 2008; Bernasco et al. 2015) and
identified as well for non-wildland arson (Prestemon et al. 2013;
Grubb and Nobles 2016).
Empirical specifications
The study location chosen is the region of Galicia, Spain, where
intentional wildfires are the dominant cause attribution (Ponte
Pintor and Bandı́n Buján 2008). Galicia is also a region with a
large enough number of intentional wildfires (half of Spain’s)
and associated arrests to permit statistical identification of
spatiotemporal effects of arrests.
Accurate quantification of the spatiotemporal displacement
of intentional firesetting due to arrests might depend on the type
of motivated offender who is beingmodelled. Therefore, we test
for the spatiotemporal effects of arrests and the effects of
elections and other driving variables by partitioning our data
according to whether a fire is classified as agriculturally or non-
agriculturally motivated. Separate evaluation of these two broad
categories of intentional firesetting could reveal the potential
biases of modelling that ignores their different nature and
uncovers their distinct spatiotemporal dynamics. Also, separate
modelling by motivation could potentially yield more accurate
assessments of the overall effects of changes in law enforcement
efforts and elections on firesetting in the region and reveal how
prevention efforts might be differently focused on these two
categories of intentional fires.
More formally, we express the probability of I intentional
wildfires started for motivation m in location j in period t as a
function of a vector of variables affecting the number of
motivated offenders in period t (Yj,t), a vector of variables
measuring the availability of suitable targets in period t (Wj,t),
and vectors of measures (Aj,t) of the presence of (effective)
capable guardians in location j and nearby locations k over l
lagged time periods as:
PrðImj;tÞ ¼ f ðYj;t;Wj;t;Aj;t;Ak;tÞ ð1Þ
Vector Yj,t, the number of motivated offenders in our study,
comprises the human population in the location (Pj,t); income-
earning (Gj,t) potential for residents of location j; the unemploy-
ment rate (Uj,t); dummies measuring holidays (Ht) and each of
two weekend days (Rt ¼ ðRSatt ;RSunt Þ), when the opportunity
costs of firesetting are lower (andmotivations higher) (Gill et al.
1987; Prestemon and Butry 2005; Prestemon et al. 2012); and a
subvector of variables describing the occurrence of an election
(Ej,t), Ej;t ¼ ðEcj;t;Ecj;tþ15;Ecj;tþ30;Ecj;tþ45;Esj;t;Edj;tÞ, where Ecj;t is a
dummy variable ¼ 1 during the next 15 days (also called
campaign days) in advance of an election, 0 otherwise; Esj;t is
a dummy variable ¼ 1 during the single silence day before
an election, 0 otherwise; and Edj;t is ¼ 1 for the single day of the
election. Note that the t þ 15, t þ 30 and t þ 45 leads of the
election campaign days dummy variable are intended to capture
3Another way to view ‘motivation’ is in terms of the prospective offender’s expected net psychic or monetary benefits of crime commission, in the form
advanced by Becker (1968). Hence, an increased probability of arrest would be expected to lower the expected net benefits of crime commission.
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the potentially long criminogenic temporal footprint of elec-
tions. Also, note that the last lead only occurs to 52 days, which
covers only the last week of the 52-day statutorily required
number of days from the announcement of an election and the
election’s actual occurrence. The motivated offender vector is
therefore Yj;t ¼ ðPj;t;Gj;t;Ut;Ht;Rt;Ej;tÞ.
The vectorWj,t, the number of suitable targets in location j in
period t, is described as a function of available flammable fuels,
which can be quantified by a vector of meteorological variables
(Zj;t), consisting of minimum daily relative humidity (Z
1
j;t), total
daily precipitation (Z2j;t), the Keetch–Byram Drought Index
(Keetch and Byram 1968) (Z3j;t), the Fire Weather Index
(Fosberg 1978) (Z4j;t), daily maximum hourly wind speed (Z
5
j;t)
and maximum daily temperature (Z6j;t) (e.g. Prestemon et al.
2012), so that Zj;t ¼ ðZ1j;t; Z2j;t; Z3j;t; Z4j;t; Z5j;t; Z6j;tÞ. It also includes
seasonal variation in firesetting (e.g. Fuller 1996), as a set of 11
month dummy variables,DMt ¼ ðDMJant ;DMFebt ; . . . ;DMNovt Þ,
with the effect of December included in the intercept. The
suitable targets vector is Wj;t ¼ ðZj;t;DMtÞ.
Finally, vectors of variables indexing capable guardianship
in location j in period t are measured by successive lags of
arrests for intentional firesetting (of either motivation, because
we lack specific information about the motivations of arrestees).
We include running sums of the count of arrests lagged t  1







. Recognising the recom-
mendations about choice of buffer distances (Phillips 2011), we
use a proportionate size criterion, with buffer radii at 10, 15 and
25 km. These radii are also justified by observed firesetting
behaviour by serial arsonists in Spain (Sotoca Plaza 2016). Vari-
ables on the neighbouring arrests were also generated using
running sums; these occurring in three successively more distant
‘doughnuts’ around the municipality: 10, 15 and 25 km, with
































The number of intentional wildfires is hypothesised to follow
a count process, distributed as Poisson butwith a variance s2 that
is a function of its expected value (mj) and a scale parameter,
a, i.e. a negative binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi 1998,
p. 70), sj ¼ mj þ m2j . Adding the time subscript (t), indicating
the motivation m and consolidating the independent variables
shown in Eqn 1 into a single vector (Xj,t) and a conforming





Eqn 2 assumes that all spatial units have independently and
identically distributed errors, a situation not likely to be met.
Therefore, a fixed-effects process is considered, allowing for
variations across municipalities in the average rates of inten-
tional wildfires due to time-invariant unobservable factors.
Therefore, Eqn 2 is augmented to include indicator parameters




m þ Dmj Þ ð3Þ
The likelihood function for Eqn 3 is:
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A random-effects version of this same general model for
cross-sectional data is also available, but in the interest of
brevity, we do not show its specification or likelihood equation.
To account for temporal autoregressivity in intentional
wildfires, we adopt a method recommended by Zeger and
Qaqish (1988) and elaborated in Cameron and Trivedi (1998,
p. 239–240). Their approach entails specifying two variables,
Imj;t1 and d
m
j;t, constructed from lags of the dependent variable:
Imj;t1 ¼ Imj;t1 and dmj;t ¼ 0; Imj;t140;
Imj;t1 ¼ 1 and dmj;t ¼ 1; Imj;t1 ¼ 0
ð5Þ
Lags of the variables specified in Eqn 5 accommodate higher




m can be augmented to include r-dimensional subvectors
Imtr and d
m
trþ1, where r is the order of autoregression. Coeffi-
cients on the elements of Imtr are estimates of autoregressive
components, and those in dmtrþ1 rescale the effect of the lagged
dependent variable in cases in which Imj;t1 ¼ 0.
The presence of significant autoregression in the dependent
variable implies that there are short-run and long-run effects of a





run effect of any non-autoregressive variable i in Xj,t on I
m




u Þ, where b̂mu is the
estimated autoregressive component u (u ¼ 1,y, r), quantified
as the coefficient of Imtu from the estimate of Eqn 3 or Eqn 4,
augmented by Imtr and d
m
trþ1.
Following Leamer (1983), and with examples of the impor-
tance of his recommendations (e.g. Levine and Renelt 1992), it
has now become standard practice in many economics journals
to test inferences across multiple specifications in order to
evaluate whether these inferences are robust to specification.
We follow this practice by testing for the effects of arrests,
elections and other hypothesised variables using several speci-
fications that carry with them different assumptions about the
intentional wildfire data generation process. In addition to a
fixed-effects negative binomial and a random-effects negative
binomial, we model intentional wildfires using four alternative
estimators, which each make differing assumptions about the
intentional wildfire data-generating process. These include (i) a
pooled (across municipalities) negative binomial model that
controls for municipality-level differences in error variance;
(ii) a pooled negative binomial (NB) model with municipality
indicators that also controls formunicipality-level differences in
error variance; and two specifications that recognise potential
zero inflation in the count of intentional wildfires: (iii) a pooled
zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model that controls for
municipality-level differences in error variance, and (iv) a
pooled ZINB with municipality indicators that also controls
for municipality-level differences in error variance.
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Evaluation of the magnitudes of the effects of the variables
of interest – arrests and elections – was done with a counter-
factual analysis. In the case of arrests, we can quantify the
long-run average effects of an arrest by, say, simulating an
increase in the number of arrests by 1% and observing how
the predicted counts of intentional wildfires changes, or
tm;A ¼ PTt¼0
PJ
j¼0 ðÎm;Ajt¼Ajtj;t  Îm;Ajt¼Ajtj;t Þ. Arrest effects are
measured with an elasticity. To evaluate the non-marginal effects
of elections, we compare the predicted counts of intentional
wildfires with the counts predicted with all election dummy
variables set to zero, tm;E ¼ PTt¼0
PJ
j¼0 ðÎm;Ejt¼0j;t  Îm;Ejt¼Ejtj;t Þ.
Election effects are measured as changes in total numbers and
percentage.
Given that our data are spatially arranged, maximum likeli-
hood estimation of any of our model specifications could
produce spatially autocorrelated residuals deriving fromomitted
spatially correlated factors (e.g. Dormann et al. 2007), which
would have the effect of attenuating standard errors. Although
more complex methods of bounding of our model coefficient
estimates do exist (e.g. Hall 1985; Liu and Singh 1992), and
these could be tried in future studies to uncover any residual
spatial autocorrelation remaining, Monte Carlo bootstrapped
generation of the effects size confidence limits provides a view
of the statistical significances of the overall effects of arrests and
elections, regardless of any possible standard error attenuation
in model estimates.
Data and estimation
We assembled data on total daily counts of reported ignitions
of agricultural (I
m¼agricultural
j;t ) and non-agricultural intentional
wildfires (I
m¼non-agricultural
j;t ) in Galicia, covering a 16-year
period between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2014. The
spatial unit of observation is the municipality (Fig. 1), of which
there are 313. The wildfire database compiled by the Spanish
Forest Service contains observations on 108 527 fires over
the 16-year span, burning 431 956 ha. Data on each wildfire
include a general cause attribution (lightning, negligence and
accidents, intentional, reignition and unknown), the majority
of which (81%) are classified as intentional. Intentional wild-
fires are further subcategorised by ‘motivation’, i.e. as either
agriculturally related (i.e. started by farmers to eliminate brush
and agricultural debris) or non-agricultural. In our econometric
estimates of the fixed effects, random effects and ZINB
models, separate equations are reported for each motivation
0 5 10 20 30 km
N
Fig. 1. A map of Galicia and its municipalities.
Wildfire spatiotemporal displacement Int. J. Wildland Fire 401
(m ¼ agricultural, non-agricultural) as well as their sum, as
mentioned.
Population data were obtained from municipal administra-
tive records. The population figurewas divided by the area of the
municipality (Pj,t), with daily changes computed by interpola-
tion. As a proxy of income level (Gj,t), we used the change in the
average income declared in annual income tax per year in the
municipality, which was provided by the Spanish Tax Agency,
and deflated with the annual average of the Consumer Price
Index by province (base year 2016); daily values were found by
interpolation. The unemployment rate (Uj,t) was the change in
the average 30-day centred average rate calculated from
monthly municipality unemployment data, with daily changes
computed by interpolation. Collected from the Public Employ-
ment Service, it was the seasonally adjusted number of unem-
ployed persons aged 16 to 64 years, divided by the total
population; daily values were found by interpolation.
Holidays (Ht) were official days recognised across Spain and
those official days recognised across Galicia only. Data on the
meteorological variables for each municipality (Zj,t) were based
on a network of weather stations distributed across Galicia; the
centre of each municipality was used as the reference location
for computing distances to eachweather station, and valueswere
generated with an inverse-distance-weighted spatial averaging
process.
Daily data on the numbers of arrests, Aj;t, were employed as
daily sums of arrests made by the Guardia Civil (gendarmerie)







and their temporal lags were generated
for three circular buffers around the centroid of themunicipality.
Centroid distance was determined using a 1 : 25 000 map of
municipalities obtained from the Galician Territorial Informa-
tion System. Note that buffers for municipalities on the edges of
the region can extend into the Atlantic Ocean, where there are no
arrests, and into Portugal and neighbouring regions of Spain,
where no consistent daily data are available on arrests. To avoid
potential biases, the sample of municipalities used was limited
to those that did not have a regional border with the rest of Spain
or an international border with Portugal within the outermost
ring of neighbourhood arrests of the municipality. Municipali-
ties with buffers that reached into the ocean were kept in the
sample.
Finally, elections variables are defined as representing the
various phases of the election cycle of any of four possible
levels: local (council), regional, national or European parlia-
mentary. Owing to their individual infrequency, identification
of the effects of the different levels of elections was usually not
possible (likelihood maximisation failed) if separately mod-
elled, compelling their aggregation.
In all models, we attempted to specify autoregressive orders
as high as five, but it was clear on estimation that high orders
preventedmany longer-order autoregressive specifications from
converging. Given the convergence problems, we limited our
models to control for only first-order autocorrelation.
The long lags of arrest data (back to t – 545) effectively
shortened the usable dataset by 1.5 years, meaning that para-
meter estimates cover mid-2000 through December 2014.
Effects are reported for the short run, which ignores the auto-
regressive effect of wildfires within a municipality, and the long
run, which incorporates the autoregressive effect. When esti-
mating separate agricultural and non-agricultural intentional
fire models, we included the lagged count and lagged zero count
indicators (Eqn 5) of both categories.When calculating the long-
run effects of elections and arrests, we used only the lagged
count of the own type (i.e. the coefficient on agricultural
intentional lagged fires was used to make the long-run adjust-
ment, and the same for the non-agricultural category).
Maximum likelihood estimation of some of the alternative
specifications of the intentional fire count models failed when
the sample of municipalities included those with fewer than 200
intentional wildfires, probably a result of lack of model para-
meter identification. To allow for greater comparability in
model results and effect size estimates, models were estimated
only for the 113 municipalities with at least 200 total intentional
wildfires over the time span. Data sources and descriptions of
variables included in models are shown in Table 1.
Results
Equation estimates
Equation estimates for the fixed-effects NB models and the
random-effects NB models are shown in Tables 2 and 3
respectively. Estimates with alternative estimators are available
from the authors. Summary estimation statistics indicate that
the model specifications are significant compared with constant-
only model estimates, as measured by the Wald Statistic,
distributed chi-squared(i). For total, agricultural and non-
agricultural fires, the random-effects NB specification (allow-
ing for differences in variances across municipalities) is
preferred over a pooledNB specificationwithmunicipality-level
heteroscedasticity, according to a chi-squared statistic and
according to the significance of the dispersion parameters, which
were all significant at a # 0.01.
Model estimates indicate that nearly all included variables
are statistically significant at a # 0.01. Nearly all variables
intended to account for suitable targets are highly statistically
significant in all model estimates, including relative humidity,
precipitation, wind speed, maximum daily temperature, the
Keetch–Byram Drought Index and the Fire Weather Index.
Forest area, however, a measure of aggregate fuels available
as ignition targets, is positively related to intentional fires, in
total and then also for agricultural intentional wildfires, though
not significant for non-agricultural intentional fires.
Variables intended to account for temporal variations in the
number of motivated offenders are typically also highly statisti-
cally significant in all models. Month indicators quantify a
seasonal pattern in firesetting for both rural agricultural (possi-
bly related to field preparation) and non-agricultural activities
(possibly related to hunting), and they are nearly all highly
statistically significantly different from the reference month of
firesetting (December), with peak rates observed in February,
March and April, an ebb in June and July, more fires in August,
and then somewhat more in autumn. In all model estimates,
variables controlling for lower opportunity costs for carrying out
firesetting at the daily time scale on non-work days, indicators
of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, are statistically significant
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at a # 0.01 and positively signed, as expected (e.g. Prestemon
and Butry 2005; Prestemon et al. 2012). Population density
generally is associated with more intentional firesetting, as
expected (more motivated firesetters per unit area) in most of
the model estimates. Unemployment, modelled as the change in
rate, meant to capture how the opportunity cost of carrying out
and getting caught setting intentional fires affects the number of
motivated offenders, is usually not statistically significant. The
rate of change in real personal income, expected to be negatively
related to the numbers of motivated offenders owing to the
higher opportunity costs of being caught intentionally igniting
wildfires, demonstrates unexpected sign differences between
intentional agricultural and non-agricultural firesetting. In the
fixed-effects NB specifications (Table 2), agricultural inten-
tional fires respond negatively to income changes, as expected,
while non-agricultural respond positively, counter to expecta-
tions (and also positively for total intentional fires). In the
random-effects NB specification (Table 3), agricultural fires
have the expected negative sign on income changes, while not
significant for non-agricultural fires and having an unexpectedly
positive association with the total number of intentional fires.
Variables intended to model spatial and temporal variations
in capable guardianship are nearly all highly significant explai-
ners of variation in intentional firesetting. Arrests at all lag
orders evaluated are strongly statistically significant (a# 0.01)
and negatively signed. These results are found for within the
municipality and at progressively greater spatiotemporal lags
around the municipality, and they are found for both the fixed-
effects and random-effects NB specifications. The negative
signs on the spatiotemporal lags of arrests support a hypothesis
that arrests do not simply displace intentional fires in space or
time; rather, they work to decrease occurrence of such fires for
long periods and across broad geographical areas near the
arrests, presumably by increasing perceived capable guardian-
ship both within the municipality and in surrounding
municipalities.
The modelled effects of elections, hypothesised to measure
both the numbers of motivated offenders (because elections
Table 1. Data sources and summary statistics of model variables for municipalities with at least 200 intentional wildfires, 1999–2014
Variable name Units Reporting
frequency
Minimum Maximum Mean Source
Intentional wildfire
ignitions
Count Daily 0 16 0.0778 General Statistics of Forest Fires, Spanish




Count Daily 0 10 0.0252 General Statistics of Forest Fires, Spanish




Count Daily 0 12 0.0526 General Statistics of Forest Fires, Spanish
Ministry of Agriculture, and Fisheries, Food
and Environment
Lightning ignitions Count Daily 0 4 0.0006 General Statistics of Forest Fires, Spanish
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food
and Environment
Other ignitions Count Daily 0 6 0.0155 General Statistics of Forest Fires, Spanish
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food
and Environment
Relative humidity Percentage Daily 18 100 59 Spanish Meteorological Agency (AEMet)
Precipitation mm Daily 0 265 4.24 Spanish Meteorological Agency (AEMet)
Keetch–Byram Drought
Index
Index number Daily 0 702 83 Spanish Meteorological Agency (AEMet)A
Fire Weather Index Index number Daily 0.36 38.52 7.78 Spanish Meteorological Agency (AEMet)A
Average daily windspeed m s1 Daily 0.05 10.66 2.69 Spanish Meteorological Agency (AEMet)
Average daily maximum
temperature
8C Daily 3.68 40.76 17.50 Spanish Meteorological Agency (AEMet)
Arrests Count Daily 0 6 0.0010 Guardia Civil
Population less than
16 years




Persons ha1 Annual 0.001 8.163 0.262 Galician Statistical Institute (Instituto Galego
de Estatistica)
Land area ha 3236 37 882 11 508 Fourth Spanish Forest Inventory
Average income Thousand euros Annual 4.35 29.59 11.31 Galician Statistical Institute (Instituto Galego
de Estatistica)
Unemployment rate Percentage Monthly 1.00 16.40 5.84 Galician Statistical Institute (Instituto Galego
de Estatistica)
Forest land area ha 1050 23 848 7500 Third Spanish Forest Inventory, Fourth
Spanish Forest Inventory
ACalculated by the authors, using AEMet data.
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encourage political protest fires) and the numbers of capable
guardians (shifting policing intensities), are consistently associ-
ated with intentional fire counts across all motivations and
model specifications. Results reveal the temporal pattern of
election-associated firesetting. First, election days either do not
have greater numbers of intentional fires (agricultural in partic-
ular) or have fewer such fires (non-agricultural). Second, silence
day has a pronounced higher rate of intentional firesetting for
total, agricultural and non-agricultural intentional fires. Third,
campaign day periods have generally no effects or positive
effects on intentional firesetting. For both the fixed-effects NB
(Table 2) and the random-effects NB, higher firesetting rates are
found in the 32 to 46 days and the 47 to 52 days before the
election day but not in the month just before the election.
Finally, we find that for total, agricultural and non-
agricultural intentional wildfires, intentional wildfires are
Table 2. Fixed effects negative binomial model estimates for all intentional, agricultural intentional and non-agricultural intentional wildfires
in Galicia
*** indicates significantly different from zero at a # 0.01, ** at a # 0.05, * at a # 0.10. Ag., agricultural; non-ag., non-agricultural
All intentional Agricultural intentional Non-agricultural intentional
Relative humidity 0.58*** 1.39*** 0.028
Precipitation 1.68*** 1.72*** 1.71***
Keetch–Byram Drought Index 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0028***
Fire Weather Index 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.26***
Wind speed 0.65*** 0.48*** 0.80***
Maximum daily temperature 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.017***
January 0.20*** 0.062 0.288***
February 0.93*** 1.04*** 0.83***
March 1.11*** 1.27*** 1.00***
April 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.65***
May 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.061
June 0.44*** 0.50*** 0.42***
July 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.58***
August 0.74*** 0.81*** 0.78***
September 0.75*** 0.83*** 0.75***
October 0.17*** 0.38*** 0.10*
November 0.07 0.12 0.045
Arrests, t  1 to t  365 0.016*** 0.028*** 0.0035
Arrests, t  365 to t  545 0.0092*** 0.017*** 0.0042**
Neighbour 1 arrests, t – to t  365 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.0103***
Neighbour 2 arrests, t – to t  365 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.021***
Neighbour 3 arrests, t – to t  365 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.018***
Neighbour 1 arrests, t  365 to t  545 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.0071***
Neighbour 2 arrests, t  365 to t  545 0.0074*** 0.007*** 0.009***
Neighbour 3 arrests, t  365 to t  545 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.012***
Saturday 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***
Sunday 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21***
Holiday 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.18***
Campaign day (2 to 16 days before) 0.019 0.0034 0.0055
Campaign day (17 to 31 days before) 0.0036 0.0896* 0.037
Campaign day (32 to 46 days before) 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.25***
Campaign day (47 to 52 days before) 0.074*** 0.11*** 0.08***
Silence day, t 0.57*** 0.62*** 0.55***
Election day, t 0.13 0.045 0.253*
Population density change, all persons, t 0.0017*** 0.002*** Not included
Forest area, t 0.0094** 0.038*** 0.0039
Unemployment rate change, t 0.082 4.34 2.01
Real total personal income change, t 5.13*** 4.32** 9.57***
Intentional fire count, t  1 0.22***
No intentional fires, t  1 1.15***
Non-ag. intentional fire count, t  1 0.045*** 0.21***
No non-ag. intentional fires, t  1 0.65*** 1.22***
Ag. intentional fire count, t  1 0.25*** 0.12***
No ag. intentional fires, t  1 1.13*** 0.57***
Constant 0.67*** 0.22 0.72***
Observations 576 074 576 074 617 319
Model Significance (Wald Test) 59 074*** 20 658*** 45 263***
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positively first-order autocorrelated at the daily time step.
Findings are similar for all model specifications, with all
parameter estimates significant at a# 0.01. For total intentional
fires, the coefficient on the intentional fire count from day t 1
is 0.22 in both the fixed- and random-effects specifications. For
agricultural intentional fires, the coefficient is 0.25 on its own
type in both specifications and 0.045 and 0.046 on the non-
agricultural fire count day t 1 in the fixed-effects and random-
effects NB specifications respectively. For non-agricultural
intentional fires, the coefficient is 0.21 on its own type and
Table 3. Random effects negative binomial model estimates for all intentional, agricultural intentional and non-agricultural intentional wildfires
in Galicia
*** indicates significantly different from zero at a # 0.01, ** at a # 0.05, * at a # 0.10. ag., agricultural; non-ag., non-agricultural
All intentional Agricultural intentional Non-agricultural intentional
Relative humidity 0.58*** 1.4*** 0.26
Precipitation 1.68*** 1.72*** 1.67***
Keetch–Byram Drought Index 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0034***
Fire Weather Index 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.24***
Wind speed 0.65*** 0.48*** 0.73***
Maximum daily temperature 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.019***
January 0.20*** 0.060 0.27***
February 0.93*** 1.05*** 0.85***
March 1.11*** 1.27*** 0.98***
April 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.68***
May 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.080
June 0.44*** 0.5*** 0.35***
July 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.47***
August 0.74*** 0.82*** 0.64***
September 0.75*** 0.84*** 0.66***
October 0.17*** 0.38*** 0.012
November 0.067 0.12 0.0011
Arrests, t 1 to t 365 0.016*** 0.028*** 0.011***
Arrests, t 365 to t 545 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.007***
Neighbour 1 arrests, t 1 to t 365 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014***
Neighbour 2 arrests, t 1 to t 365 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.025***
Neighbour 3 arrests, t 1 to t 365 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.022***
Neighbour 1 arrests, t 365 to t 545 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.0069***
Neighbour 2 arrests, t 365 to t 545 0.007*** 0.0068*** 0.0081***
Neighbour 3 arrests, t 365 to t 545 0.011*** 0.0081*** 0.013***
Saturday 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***
Sunday 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.23***
Holiday 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.18***
Campaign day (2 to 16 days before) 0.019 0.0035 0.029
Campaign day (17 to 31 days before) 0.0038 0.090* 0.044
Campaign day (32 to 46 days before) 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14***
Campaign day (47 to 52 days before) 0.074*** 0.11*** 0.058***
Silence day, t 0.57*** 0.62*** 0.51***
Election day, t 0.14 0.045 0.28**
Population density change, all persons, t 0.0016*** 0.0020*** 0.0015***
Forest area, t 0.0134*** 0.040*** 0.0024
Unemployment rate change, t 0.12 4.304 3.262
Real total personal income change, t 5.17*** 4.32** 0.26
Intentional fire count, t 1 0.22***
No intentional fires, t 1 1.16***
Non-ag. intentional fire count, t 1 0.046*** 0.21***
No non-ag. intentional fires, t 1 0.65*** 1.18***
Ag. intentional fire count, t 1 0.25*** 0.12***
No ag. intentional fires, t 1 1.13*** 0.54***
Constant 0.69*** 0.23 0.54***
Natural log of overdispersion parameter a (rho) 3.22*** 2.30*** 3.29***
Natural log of overdispersion parameter a (sigma) 2.29*** 0.60*** 2.23***
Observations 576 074 576 074 576 074
Model significance (Wald Test) 59 707*** 20 713*** 44 031***
Likelihood ratio test vs pooled 4285*** 6183*** 2606***
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0.12 on the agricultural fire count from day t 1, and the values
are the same in both the fixed-effects and random-effects NB
specifications. In all specifications and fire types, coefficients
controlling for zero fires in the previous day are negative, as
expected, which shows that a count of zero fires in day t  1
leads to fewer intentional fires in day t.
Effect size estimates
Summary effects of elections and arrests on total, agricultural
and non-agricultural intentional wildfires are shown in
Tables 4–6. The results are arranged according to the fixed-
effects NB, random-effects NB and the four alternative esti-
mators. The intentional wildfires in the 113 municipalities
analysed, over the time span of our sample, represented
,77% of all intentional, 84% of all agricultural intentional
and 74% of all non-agricultural intentional fires that occurred
in the municipalities whose 25-km arrest buffers did not cross
into Portugal or the rest of Spain. If our equations were to be
applied as well to the municipalities in Galicia meeting the
buffer restrictions but having fewer than 200 intentional fires
(1999–2014), the simulated changes in total fire counts would
be larger and the percentage changes would be different than
those shown in Tables 4–6.
Effect sizes of arrests and of elections for the modelled 113
municipalities are statistically different from zero at a# 0.01 in
all specifications except for one alternative estimator, the pooled
ZINB with municipality indicators and municipality-level het-
eroscedasticity for non-agricultural intentional wildfires, for
which election effect sizes are significant at a # 0.05.
Across all specifications and model versions, arrests are
associated with a reduction in the counts of intentional wild-
fires in the municipality. Arrests in the previous 545 days
before day t reduce wildfire occurrences in the municipality in
day t. For the total of intentional wildfires (Table 4), the short-
run elasticity of an arrest – i.e. the percentage change in the
number of intentional fires given a 1% increase in the number
of arrests – is0.93 and0.92 in the fixed-effects and random-
effects NB specifications respectively and ranges from 0.29
to 0.51 among the four alternative estimators. Long-run
effects, which account for the autoregressive component in
Table 4. Effects of elections and arrests on all intentional wildfires in Galicia


























Fixed effects NB 1330*** 1649*** 2.69*** 3.33*** 0.93*** 1.20***
Random effects NB 1328*** 1649*** 2.68*** 3.33*** 0.92*** 1.18***
Alternative estimators
Pooled NB, clustered errors 749*** 1135*** 1.51*** 2.29*** 0.36*** 0.60***
Pooled NB, municipality
indicators, clustered errors
665*** 903*** 1.34*** 1.83*** 0.51*** 0.73***
Pooled ZINB, clustered
errors
796*** 1240*** 1.56*** 2.44*** 0.29*** 0.46***
Pooled ZINB, municipality
indicators, clustered errors
498*** 687*** 0.98*** 1.35*** 0.41*** 0.57***
Table 5. Effects of elections and arrests on agricultural intentional wildfires in Galicia

























Fixed effects NB 1264*** 1630*** 7.88*** 10.16*** 1.68*** 2.25***
Random effects NB 1263*** 1631*** 7.88*** 10.17*** 1.67*** 2.24***
Alternative estimators
Pooled NB, clustered errors 344*** 594*** 2.14*** 3.70*** 0.29*** 0.57***
Pooled NB, municipality
indicators, clustered errors
306*** 435*** 1.91*** 2.71*** 0.43*** 0.66***
Pooled ZINB, clustered
errors
342*** 623*** 2.05*** 3.74*** 0.24*** 0.43***
Pooled ZINB, municipality
indicators, clustered errors
228*** 327*** 1.38*** 1.99*** 0.36*** 0.52***
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the intentional wildfire count process, are larger, at 1.20 and
1.18 for the fixed-effects and random-effects NB specifica-
tions respectively, and range from 0.46 to 0.73 among
the alternative estimators. For agricultural intentional fires
(Table 5), the effects of arrests are substantially larger.
Short-run effects are 1.68 and 1.67 and long-run effects
are 2.25 and 2.24 in the fixed-effects and random-effects
NB specifications respectively. For the alternative estimators,
short-run effects range from an elasticity of0.24 to0.43 and
long-run effects 0.43 to 0.66. Non-agricultural intentional
fires are more inelastically related to arrests (Table 6). Arrest
elasticities in the short run range from0.94 and1.13 and in
the long run from 1.19 to 1.43 in the fixed-effects and
random-effects NB specifications respectively. Alternative
estimators produce elasticity estimates from 0.32 to 0.54
in the short run and 0.48 to 0.78 in the long run.
Across all types of intentional fires and all specifications, the
net effect of an election in Galicia is to increase the number of
intentional wildfires. As shown in Tables 4–6, and as we did for
arrests, we assessed the overall impacts of elections on fire-
setting in both the short run and the long run. Tables 4–6 report
the simulated effects of setting all election indicator variables to
zero and quantifying the simulated counterfactual of no elec-
tions during the duration of our estimation dataset (mid-2000 to
December 2014).
Consistent with the positive signs on many of the election
indicator variables (Tables 2 and 3), the effect of simulating
no elections is to reduce the total number and also the number
of agricultural and non-agricultural intentional wildfires. For
the sum of agricultural and non-agricultural models (Table 4),
short-run effects are 1330 and 1328 in the short run for
the fixed-effects and random-effects NB specifications, and
1649 in the long run for both specifications. Short-run
effects among the alternative estimators range from 498 to
796 and long-run effects from687 to1240. In percentage
terms, the simulated effect of not having elections would be to
reduce the total number of intentional fires by 3.33% in the
long run according to the fixed-effects and random-effects NB
specifications, and from 1.35 to 2.44% among the alterna-
tive estimators.
Effects of elections on agricultural fires (Table 5) are similar
in magnitude but larger in percentage terms, compared with
those quantified by the total intentional fire models. This finding
indicates that aggregating both agricultural and non-agricultural
intentional fires in a single model likely produces downwardly
biased parameter estimates – i.e. aggregation bias. As shown in
Table 5, both the fixed-effects and random-effects NB specifi-
cations produce nearly identical short- and long-run simulated
reductions in the expected fires. In the long run, the change in the
number of intentional agricultural fires is approximately1630,
corresponding to10.16% for the fixed-effects NB. Alternative
estimators had long-run effects ranging from327 to623 and
percentage changes from 1.99 to 3.74%.
For non-agricultural intentional fires, effects of simulated
no-elections counterfactuals (Table 6) are also larger in percent-
age terms than found in the total intentional fire count changes
(Table 4). For the fixed-effects NB specification, the long-run
effect is 1986, or 5.78%. For the random-effects NB speci-
fication, the corresponding values are 934 and 2.79%. For
the alternative estimators, the long-run effects range from386
to 778, changes corresponding to 1.12 to 2.25%.
Combining the effects reported in Tables 5 and 6, we can
quantify the total effect more accurately than by using the total
intentional fire model effects shown in Table 4. For example, if
we sum the fixed-effects NB specification long-run effect of
1630 for the agricultural fires and 1986 for the non-
agricultural fires, we have 3616, a change of approximately
7.18% in the number of total intentional wildfires, calculated
over mid-2000 through the end of 2014. For the random-effects
NB specifications in Tables 5 and 6, the summed effects are
2565 and 5.19%. These long-run values can be compared
with the corresponding values shown in Table 4, which are
1649 and 3.33%, which are produced by both the fixed-
effects and random-effects NB specification effects.
Table 6. Effects of elections and arrests on non-agricultural intentional wildfires in Galicia



























Fixed effects NB 1625*** 1986*** 4.73*** 5.78*** 0.94*** 1.19***
Random effects NB 768*** 934*** 2.30*** 2.79*** 1.13*** 1.43***
Alternative estimators
Pooled NB, clustered errors 428*** 619*** 1.28*** 1.85*** 0.39*** 0.62***
Pooled NB, municipality
indicators, clustered errors
362*** 486*** 1.08*** 1.45*** 0.54*** 0.78***
Pooled ZINB, clustered
errors
513*** 778*** 1.48*** 2.25*** 0.32*** 0.48***
Pooled ZINB, municipality
indicators, clustered errors
278** 386** 0.80** 1.12** 0.44*** 0.60***
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Discussion and conclusions
This study set out to evaluate whether arrests affect the spatio-
temporal distribution of intentionally set future wildfires, which
can provide insights regarding the overall effectiveness of law
enforcement efforts. We used geographically and chronologi-
cally precise data on fire occurrence and arrests in Galicia to
examine, based on the theoretical framework of RA theory
(Cohen and Felson 1979), whether wildfire numbers changed
locally and in nearby locations following intentional wildfire-
related arrests.
Statistical model estimates indicate that variables connected
to the three elements of RA theory were related to intentional
firesetting, generally, in the ways expected. The numbers of
motivated offenders were measured by population density,
indicators of election periods, indicators of seasons when
agricultural areas are being prepared for planting, and variables
quantifying the opportunity costs of carrying out or potentially
being arrested for intentional firesetting. The only motivated
offender variables that did not have a sign in the direction
expected or significant in our empirical specifications were
unemployment and income. For suitable targets, quantified by
variables measuring aggregate fuels quantities (forest area) and
amenable weather conditions (fire weather indices and several
direct meteorological variables), the RA framing was supported
by the signs and the significances of parameter estimates.
Primary measures of the presence or absence of capable guar-
dianswere the temporal and spatiotemporal lags of recent arrests
for intentional firesetting and election variables. Arrests were
hypothesised to communicate to motivated intentional fireset-
ters that their likelihood of arrest, and hence capable guardian-
ship, has increased. We found that all temporal and
spatiotemporal lags of arrests were highly statistically signifi-
cantly and negatively related to counts of intentional wildfires at
all spatiotemporal lags tested, a finding expected given either
perceived broad-scale increases in capable guardianship or
overall decreases in motivated offenders. Election variables
were also generally statistically significantly related to inten-
tional firesetting, adding additional weight to the usefulness of
the RA-based theoretical framework for this crime process.
Our study demonstrated that our hypotheses regarding poten-
tial spatiotemporal displacement of the effects of arrests and the
effects of elections were robust to assumptions about the form of
the wildfire data generation process. The fixed-effects and
random-effects NB specifications generated broadly similar
effect sizes and strong statistical significances. Although also
strongly statistically significant and signed in the same way,
estimates generated by arguably less-well-fitting specifications,
including the pooled NB models and the zero-inflated pooled
NB models, produced effect sizes that were somewhat smaller.
The separate estimation of agricultural and non-agricultural
intentional fire models highlighted the importance of separately
modelling intentional fires by motivation of the firesetter. One
benefit of the disaggregation was to reveal that the effects of
arrests and of elections were larger than when all motivations
were combined and modelled together. Separate estimation
produced summed total effect sizes of arrests and of elections
that weremore than twice as large as the effect sizes produced by
models that combined them. In future research, analysts would
be counselled to model intentional fires at as fine a level of
motivational aggregation as can be supported by the data.
Another benefit of the separate modelling was to reveal the
differences in the magnitudes of the effects of driving variables
on intentional firesetting of different motivations. A compari-
son of the results reveals that agricultural fires are more
elastically related to an arrest. The greater sensitivity of
agricultural intentional firesetting to arrests could be consid-
ered in the context of the profit-maximising behaviour of an
agriculturist, who decides when and whether to use fire as a
land-clearing method, including in times when such fire use is
forbidden. Because agriculturists depend on agriculture for
their livelihoods, it makes sense that they would be particularly
responsive to conditions under which their expected incomes
would be reduced by criminal sanctions. The differential arrest
sensitivity of these two classes of motivation also implies that
attention to their relative prevalence in a landscape could be
considered when making decisions on how to optimally deploy
law enforcement resources across an agricultural–wildland
gradient: in agricultural intentional wildfire-dominated land-
scapes, arrests would yield larger overall wildfire reductions
than in places where non-agriculturally motivated firesetting
predominates.
Although law enforcement resource allocations are guided
by a variety of trade-off considerations, including attention to
non-wildfire crimes and reducing fear of crime (Weisburd and
Eck 2004), our results could aid policy-makers in assessing the
consequences of police resource trade-offs. And although not
explicitly designed to forecast future intentional wildfire loca-
tions in the formmodelled by Prestemon et al. (2012), our results
are potentially useful for implementing problem-oriented polic-
ing (e.g. Goldstein 1979;Weisburd et al. 2010) and intelligence-
led policing (e.g. Ratcliffe 2016) strategies that focus on
anticipating spatiotemporal crime concentrations and on identi-
fying and incapacitating repeat offenders (e.g. serial arsonists).
In the particular case of Galicia, by characterising howwildfires
are concentrated in space–time and how the effects of arrests
(and elections) alter such concentrations, our findings could help
police organisations identify proactive steps to reducing inten-
tional wildfire occurrences.
Our results do not provide support for the existence of spatial
displacement caused by one measure of law enforcement effort,
the number of arrests (e.g. Eck 1993), a finding consistent with
other research on the effects of stepped-up policing (Bowers
et al. 2011; Telep et al. 2014). Further study would be required
to detect the effects of more distant (.25 km) and longer-lasting
(.1.5 years) spatiotemporal lags of arrests.
The arrest findings are possibly related to altered adjustments
in perceptions of increased capable guardianship in response to
local arrests. In Spain, fewer than 10% of intentional wildfire
cases result in a conviction and sanction, a relatively low rate of
clearance compared with other crime types, due to evidentiary
difficulties (Fiscalı́a General del Estado Medio Ambiente y
Urbanismo 2016). Furthermore, most convictions typically lead
to fines, not imprisonment, the latter outcome primarily reserved
for repeat offenders (e.g. González et al. 2017). Given the low
probability of imprisonment for firesetting, we conclude that
arrests primarily result in a perceived increase in capable
guardianship rather than a reduction in motivated offenders.
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Although we could identify no published research on how
arrests for intentional firesetting are communicated across a
population of motivated firesetters, such as through traditional
and social media, the precise mechanisms of information diffu-
sion responsible for changes in perceived capable guardianship
are an area worthy of additional study.
Our analyses also offer evidence that political activity is
associated with increased overall rates of intentional firesetting.
The signs and significances of the various election indicator
variables highlight the potentially complex behavioural patterns
among political protest actors in Galicia. Furthermore, the
identified temporal pattern of the effects of elections on inten-
tional firesetting provides a roadmap for new strategies for
allocating law enforcement resources during the election cycle.
Four to seven weeks before an election, intentional firesetting is
elevated. This is followed by a 4-week window approaching
silence day and election day of normal rates of firesetting, a
silence day spike in intentional fires, and then low to normal
rates on election day. The measured overall (net) effect of the
entire election cycle, however, is to boost intentional firesetting.
The fixed-effects and random-effects NB specifications implied
that a no-election counterfactual had up to 10% fewer agricul-
turally based intentional fires and 6% fewer non-agriculturally
based intentional fires, with smaller impacts measured by the
alternative estimators. Consistent with the conclusions of Kull
(2002) and Skouras and Christodoulakis (2014), the larger
agricultural effect of election cycles may occur because farmers
perceive that capable guardianship is lower – i.e. the likelihood
of being caught and sanctioned is lower – during (the earlier
phase of) campaigns, when law enforcement may direct more
resources towards addressing spikes in other forms of social
disruption. Likewise, election periods might increase the num-
bers of prospective offenders who are motivated to focus
politicians’ and the media’s attention to ongoing public–
government disagreements about how forests are managed
(Hovardas 2014). Ramos and Sanz (2018) provide statistical
evidence that large accidental wildfires may affect election
outcomes, favouring the incumbent party in municipal elections
in Spain. If the conflict hypothesis is a partial explanation for the
statistical evidence that our models provide, then policy-makers
could use our results to help evaluate the potential benefits of
efforts to reduce such conflicts.
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del incendiario forestal español privado de libertad. Behavior & Law
Journal 3, 26–34.
Grubb JA, Nobles R (2016) A spatiotemporal analysis of arson. Journal
of Research in Crime and Delinquency 53, 66–92. doi:10.1177/
0022427815590858
Guerette RT (2009) Analyzing crime displacement and diffusion. ‘Problem-
Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Solving Tools Series No. 10’ (US
Department of Justice: Washington, DC, USA) Available at https://ric-
zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p167-pub.pdf [Verified 7 May 2019]
Guerette RT, Bowers KJ (2009) Assessing the extent of crime displacement
and diffusion of benefits: a review of situational crime prevention
evaluations. Criminology 47, 1331–1368. doi:10.1111/J.1745-9125.
2009.00177.X
Hall P (1985) Resampling a coverage pattern. Stochastic Processes and
their Applications 20, 231–246. doi:10.1016/0304-4149(85)90212-1
Hovardas T (2014) ‘Playing with fire’ in a pre-election period: newspaper
coverage of 2007 wildfires in Greece. Society & Natural Resources 27,
689–705. doi:10.1080/08941920.2014.901462
Hovardas T (2015) An ‘asymmetric threat’ that should have been antici-
pated: political discourse on 2007 wildfires in Greece. Environmental
Communication 9, 409–427. doi:10.1080/17524032.2014.981282
Jolly WM, Cochrane MA, Freeborn PH, Holden ZA, Brown TJ,
Williamson GJ, Bowman DMJS (2015) Climate-induced variations in
global wildfire danger from 1979 to 2013. Nature Communications 6,
7537. doi:10.1038/NCOMMS8537
Keetch JJ, Byram GM (1968) A drought index for forest fire control. USDA
Forest Service, Research Paper SE-38. (Southeastern Forest Experiment
Station: Asheville, NC, USA).
Kocsis RN, Irwin HJ (1997) An analysis of spatial patterns in serial rape,
arson, and burglary: the utility of the circle theory of environmental
range for psychological profiling. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 4,
195–206. doi:10.1080/13218719709524910
Krawchuk MA, Moritz MA, Parisien M-A, Van Dorn J, Hayhoe K (2009)
Global pyrogeography: the current and future distribution of wildfire.
PLoS One 4, e5102. doi:10.1371/JOURNAL.PONE.0005102
Kull CA (2002) Madagascar aflame: landscape burning as peasant protest,
resistance, or resource management tool? Political Geography 21, 927–
953. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00054-9
Leamer EE (1983) Let’s take the con out of econometrics. The American
Economic Review 77, 31–43.
Levine R, Renelt D (1992) A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth
regressions. The American Economic Review 82, 942–963.
Levitt SD (1997)Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect
of police on crime. The American Economic Review 87, 270–290.
Levitt SD (1998) Why do increased arrest rates appear to reduce crime?
Deterrence, incapacitation, or measurement error?Economic Inquiry 36,
353–372. doi:10.1111/J.1465-7295.1998.TB01720.X
Liu RY, SinghK (1992)Moving-blocks jacknife and bootstrap captureweak
dependence. In ‘Exploring the limits of the bootstrap’. (Eds R Lesage,
L Billard) pp. 225–248 (Wiley: New York, NY, USA).
Liu Y, Stanturf J, Goodrick S (2010) Trends in global wildfire potential in a
changing climate. Forest Ecology and Management 259, 685–697.
doi:10.1016/J.FORECO.2009.09.002
Mothershead PT (2012) Geospatial analysis of socioeconomic risk factors
affecting wildfire arson occurrence in the south-eastern United States.
MS thesis, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA.
Phillips C (2011) Situational crime prevention and crime displacement:
myths and miracles? Internet Journal of Criminology. Available at
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/b93dd4_d84b686ba20d4058941fc90e4b24
39cd.pdf [Verified 7 May 2019]
Pogarsky G, Piquero AR, Paternoster R (2004) Modeling change in
perceptions about sanction threats: the neglected linkage in deterrence
theory. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 20, 343–369. doi:10.1007/
S10940-004-5868-Z
Ponte Pintor JM, Bandı́n Buján C (2008) Los incendios forestales enGalicia
y su investigación.Estudios Penales y CriminológicosXXVIII, 317–341.
Prestemon JP, Butry DT (2005) Time to burn: modeling wildland arson as
an autoregressive crime function. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 87, 756–770. doi:10.1111/J.1467-8276.2005.00760.X
Prestemon JP, Butry DT (2010) Wildland arson: a research assessment. In
‘Advances in threat assessment and their application to forest and range-
land management’. (Eds JM Pye, HM Rauscher, Y Sands, DC Lee,
JS Beatty) USDA Forest Service, General Technical Report PNW-802,
pp. 271–283. (Pacific Northwest Research Station: Portland, OR, USA)
Prestemon JP, Chas-Amil ML, Touza Montero J, Goodrick SJ (2012)
Forecasting intentional wildfires using temporal and spatiotemporal
autocorrelations. International Journal of Wildland Fire 21, 743–754.
doi:10.1071/WF11049
Prestemon JP, Butry DT, Thomas DS (2013) Exploiting autoregressive
properties to develop prospective urban arson forecasts by target.
Applied Geography 44, 143–153. doi:10.1016/J.APGEOG.2013.07.015
Pyne SJ (1995) ‘World fire.’ (Henry Holt: New York, NY, USA)
Ramos R, Sanz C (2018) Backing the incumbent in difficult times: the
electoral impact of wildfires.Working paper no. 1810. (Banco de España)
Available at www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/
PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/18/Files/dt1810e.pdf [Veri-
fied 6 June 2018]
Ratcliffe JH (2016) ‘Intelligence-led policing.’ (Routledge: London, UK)
Ratcliffe JH, Rengert GF (2008) Near repeat patterns in Philadelphia
shootings. Security Journal 21, 58–76. doi:10.1057/PALGRAVE.SJ.
8350068
Sebastián-López A, Salvador-Civil R, Gonzalo-Jiménez J, San-Miguel-
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